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Lt. Col. Sándor Nagy:
CURRENT CHALLENGES OF RISK ASSESSMENT 
IN LIGHT OF POPULATION PROTECTION
ABSTRACT: The package of cardinal laws on Disaster Management, effective from 01 January 
2012, has fundamentally transposed the procedures of population protection by introduc-
ing risk assessment of hazard sources concerning population protection. The system thus 
designed, has reliably functioned in the past six years and has ensured the hazard response 
planning of settlements based on real-life vulnerabilities, thus population protection planning. 
However, it was developed in a very different security environment. Thus, apart from natural 
and man-made hazard sources, it does not address the assessment of hazards concerning 
the population, bound to the armed defense of the country or armed operations. For the sake 
of the six-year operation, the changed security environment and the all-hazard approach, 
it is advisable to review the current system. The purpose of this study is, besides raising the 
problem and presenting the current “Fuzzy” logic process in Hungary, to propose a solution 
to expand it for the sake of an all-hazard approach.
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INTRODUCTION
An important milestone of hazard response planning in Hungary was the replacement of an 
old-fashioned emergency planning method, taking into account all hazards at the same level, 
by designing a hazard response planning process meeting the requirements of the present, 
based on risk assessment.
Prior to the entry into force of the current system, defense/protection planning was 
regulated by Gov. Decree 114/1995. (IX. 27) on the rules of civil protection classification of 
settlements and defense/protection requirements, however, with the entry into force of the 
new defense and disaster management acts and their implementation decrees, this decree 
was repealed. Although the former civil protection classification had taken into account 
the vulnerability of settlements, the direct impacts; as a consequence of the public admin-
istration, infrastructure and industry center characters, as well as their role in road and rail 
transportation, during armed conflicts; and it had prescribed planning tasks as well, while 
it had not assessed risks based on the probability of their occurrence and impacts.
It was a descriptive regulation, in which, for example, settlements within a 30-km zone 
measured from the border, in the territory of which a plant producing, using or storing hazard-
ous materials operated, was classified in the highest category by default and also included a 
safety standard for this. The biggest mistake of the regulation was that the settlements were 
prepared on the basis of civil protection classification and not for real risks.
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The currently functioning procedure, stipulated by law1, is a risk analysis based on the 
principle of the “Fuzzy” logic that I present in this article. The “Fuzzy” logic process, because 
of its ease of handling resulting from its matrix structure, is perfectly suited to be used with-
out higher professional population protection qualifications, hence to group settlements in 
disaster management classes, but from the hazard sources relevant to population protection it 
does not deal with the analysis of population risks associated with armed conflicts or threats. 
The security environment has considerably changed in the past three years. What shows 
it the best is that the NATO heads of state and government leaders at their Warsaw Confer-
ences in July 2016 made a commitment2 to strengthen civil preparedness, named as the 
central pillar of the resilience of the Alliance, and in this relation NATO determined seven 
baseline requirements.3
The current disaster risk assessment process is simple and works efficiently, however, 
the population and property are jeopardized not only by natural and industrial disasters. The 
need therefore arises, based on the all-hazard approach, to consider whether risk assessment, 
currently used for population protection, can be supplemented by a procedure that takes 
into account risks associated with armed threats. Is it possible to analyze at all the risks of 
various hazards in one system, including population risks associated with armed conflicts?
THE PRACTICE OF DISASTER RISK ASSESSMENT IN HUNGARY
Settlement level risk assessment 
In the practice of risk assessments in Hungary, the legislation4, describing the disaster man-
agement classification of settlements, is the first legislation, in which the grouping of hazard 
sources is listed, relevant from the aspect of population protection. They are as follows:
1. Natural disasters and hazard sources
a) Flood,
b) Inland water,
c) Extreme weather,
d) Geological hazard sources:
da) earthquake,
db) landslide,
dc) rupture,
de) soil subsidence,
df) wall collapse.
1 Gov Decree 234/2011. (XI. 10.) on the Government implementing Act No. CXXVIII of 2011 concerning dis-
aster management and amending certain related acts. http://njt.hu/cgi_bin/njt_doc.cgi?docid=140039.349975, 
Accessed on 12 January 2018.
2 “Fact Sheet of Warsaw Summit Key Decisions”. NATO. February 2017. https://www.nato.int/nato_static_fl2014/
assets/pdf/pdf_2017_02/20170206_1702-factsheet-warsaw-summit-key-en.pdf, Accessed on 12 December 2017.
3 NATO Seven Baseline Requirements. See: Shea, J. “Resilience: a core element of collective defence”. NATO 
Review. 2016. https://www.nato.int/docu/Review/2016/Also-in-2016/nato-defence-cyber-resilience/EN/index.
htm, Accessed on 29 December 2017.
4 Gov Decree 234/2011.
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2. Industrial accidents and man-made hazards
a) Plants under Chapter IV of the Act on Disaster Management,
 b) Impacts by other establishments (industrial, agricultural), the risk of release of 
hazardous materials,
c) Distance from nuclear establishments:
ca) nuclear power plant,
cb) research reactor.
d) Traffic routes and junctions:
da) transportation of hazardous materials,
db) considerable traffic.
 e) Plants and other establishments involving hazardous materials not under Chapter 
IV of the Act on Disaster Management, operated for military purposes.
3. Hazards of other origin
a) The vulnerability of surface and subsurface water (mainly drinking water bases),
b) Human epidemics or the danger of epidemics, and animal epidemics,
c) Air pollution reaching the alert threshold.
4. Risks relating to critical infrastructures
a) The vulnerability of infrastructures providing basic supply of the population,
b) The vulnerability of transportation/traffic,
 c) The vulnerability of public administration and infrastructures indirectly providing 
the supply of the population.
The codification of the above listing was necessary to identify risks in a uniform way 
in Hungary, in 3,177 settlements or districts of the capital. In the settlement risk assessment 
procedure, risk identification is performed by checking the compliance according to a grouped 
list. Undoubtedly, non-definable risks concerning a particular settlement are excluded. For 
example, in the case of the vast majority of settlements in the southern part of the Great 
Hungarian Plain, items 1. d. db) – df) do not have to be included in the risk analysis as these 
hazard sources cannot be detected there.
Risk identification is performed on the basis of regulation; it means the examination 
of the related threat effect is possible if it appears in that particular settlement. The risks 
thus identified are analyzed in terms of the probability of occurrence and the severity of 
the triggered effect.
The probability of occurrence is the definition of the occurrence frequency of the hazard 
relevant to the given settlement, based on historical-statistical data, there is a formalized 
probability estimate. The other is the assessment of the consequences of the occurrence of 
a risk or risks, or the definition of the severity thereof. The frequency of occurrence and the 
impact assessed together, depicted on a so-called risk matrix that gives the result of the risk 
assessment method, that is, a disaster management classification. A hazard response plan 
is based on a disaster management classification, including the alert of the population, the 
method of population protection, the funds needed to initiate protection, as well as planning 
the involvement of special equipment and trained experts (voluntary rescue organizations). 
The establishment of civil protection organizations, forming the backbone of the self-defense 
capabilities of settlements, their organizational structure and their minimum number are 
also connected to classification.
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We can see the structure of the risk matrix in the figure below:
Impact Frequency of occurrence
Rare Not frequent Frequent Very frequent
Very severe Class II Class II Class I Class I
Severe Class III Class II Class II Class I
Not severe Class III Class III Class II Class II
Low Class III Class III Class III Class III
Figure 1: Risk matrix
Source: Annex 2 of Gov. Decree 234/2011.
The logic used for compliance with dual conditions is the Fuzzy logic5 therefore litera-
ture calls the relationship of severity and probability conditions in relation to each other as 
Fuzzy matrix, assessing the matrix as above. 
In my opinion, the only weakness of this matrix is that it only distinguishes three risk 
classes. In a country where there are 3,177 settlements and districts of the capital, charac-
terized by very different natural conditions, the scissors are very narrow, which shows the 
differences, so the inaccuracy of the risk assessment is higher.
Another feature of the Hungarian disaster risk assessment system is that it establishes a 
special regulation for industrial vulnerabilities, based on which settlements that are directly 
threatened in the 3-kilometer radius of the nuclear power plant and in the 1-kilometer radius 
of the research reactor shall be classified in Class I, or are threatened by a plant under the 
effect of Chapter IV of Act CXXVIII of 2011 on Disaster Management and on the amend-
ment of certain acts in relation (Act on Disaster Management) and are bound to draft an 
off-site protection plan. Settlements that are indirectly threatened by the nuclear power plant 
(located in the 3 to 30-kilometer radius) shall be classified as Class II, or are threatened by a 
plant under the effect of Chapter IV of the Act on Disaster Management and are not bound 
to draft an off-site protection plan. Settlements whose territories are threatened in case of 
the release of hazardous materials from a plant not under the effect of Chapter IV of the Act 
on Disaster Management shall fall in Class III.
To be exhaustive, it should be noted that the regulation of the current industrial safety 
area, the general risk management factors may also be found, such as the definition of a 
hazard that means the identification of the possibility of a major accident determining the 
occurrence frequency and probability of a major accident involving potential hazardous 
materials; the assessment of the consequences of a major accident involving the identified 
hazardous materials; the presentation and evaluation of the possible domino effects, and 
their consequences.
For the purpose of defining individual and social risks, the regulation integrates the 
probability and the consequences of major accidents related to hazardous materials, affect-
ing an area by their impacts. When calculating a social risk not only the population living 
in the vulnerable area, but people staying there periodically, in a significant number (e.g., 
5 Chinho, L. and Hsieh, P. J. “A fuzzy decision support system for strategic portfolio management”. Decision 
Support Systems 38/3. 2014. 383–398. https://pdfs.semanticscholar.org/ca2e/921771ce61e84197b030b9034bcf
c8b6e2bf.pdf, Accessed on 18 December 2017.
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workplace, shopping center, school, entertainments, etc.) are also taken into account. The 
more people can be affected by lethal impacts, the less acceptable a social risk is. Thus, 
contrary to the constant values of individual risk levels, the level of social risk can only be 
defined6 as a function of the expected number of victims (deaths). 
The X-axis of the F-N curve indicates the number of deaths (N). The number of deaths 
must be displayed on a logarithmic scale and the smallest displayed value is 1. The Y-axis 
of the F-N curve represents the aggregate frequency of accidents involving the death of N 
or more people. This accumulated frequency should be displayed on a logarithmic scale and 
the smallest displayed value is 10-9 1/year.
The industrial safety risk analysis is a quantitative risk analysis process, a part of which 
is the definition and analysis7 of possible accident series of incidents. To analyze the conse-
quences of an incident software procedures or guidelines internationally accepted are available. 
For population protection it is especially important that the consequences of a particular 
hazardous industrial accident stay within the establishment or affect the population living 
in its surroundings, directly or indirectly, via other intermediary means.
During an official authorization process, the above risk analysis procedures – which 
are prepared by the operator in a safety report and safety analysis – and during their review, 
the authority decides if the given plant is obliged or not to draft an off-site protection plan, 
due to its hazard impacts. 
For the protection of the population it is especially important that the consequences 
of a particular hazardous industrial accident remain within the establishment or reach a 
population living in its surroundings, directly or indirectly via other intermediary medium.
6 Gov. Decree 219/2011. (X. 20.) on the protection against major accidents involving dangerous substances. http://
njt.hu/cgi_bin/njt_doc.cgi?docid=139993.347708, Accessed on 02 January 2018.
7 Kátai-Urbán, L. “Evaluation and development of the conditions of application of the protection measures 
against the transboundary effects of industrial accidents”. Thesis presented for the degree of PhD. Miklós 
Zrínyi National Defense University, Military Technical Doctoral School, Budapest, 2006.
classified as Class II, or are threatened by a plant under the effect of Chapter IV of the Act on 
Disaster Management and are not bound to draft an off-site protection plan. Settlements whose 
territories are threatened in case of the release of hazardous materials from a plant not under the 
effect of Chapter IV of the Act on Disaster Management shall fall in Class III. 
To be exhaustive, it should be noted that the regulation of the current industrial safety area, the 
general risk management factors may also be found, such as the definition of a hazard that means 
the identification of the possibility of a major accident determining the occurrence frequency and 
probability of a major accident involving potential hazardous materials; the assessment of the 
consequences of a major accident involving the identified hazardous materials; the presentation and 
evaluation of the possible domino effects, and their consequences. 
For the purpose of defining individual and social risks, the regulation integrates the probability 
and the consequences of major accidents related to hazardous materials, affecting an area by their 
impacts. When calculating a social risk not only the population living in the vulnerable area, but 
people staying there periodically, in a significant number (e.g., workplace, shopping center, school, 
entertainments, etc.) are also taken into account. The more people can be affected by lethal impacts, 
the less acceptable a social risk is. Thus, contrary to the constant values of individual risk levels, the 
level of social risk can only be defined6 as a function of the expected number of victims (deaths).  
Figure 2: Industrial Safety Social Risk Matrix 
Source: Annex 7 of Gov. Decree 219/2011. 
Risk level (F) Acceptable risk Risk reductio  nec sary Unacceptable risk Number of deaths (N)
The X-axis of the F-N curve indicates the number of deaths (N). The number of deaths must be 
displayed on a logarithmic scale and the smallest displayed value is 1. The Y-axis of the F-N curve 
represents the aggregate frequency of accidents involving the death of N or more people. This 
accumulated frequ ncy shou d b  displayed on a logari hm c scale and the smallest displayed value 
is 10-9 1/year. 
The industrial safety risk analysis is a quantitative risk analysis process, a art of wh ch is the 
definition and analysis7 of possible accident series of incide s. To analyz  the consequences of an 
incident software procedures or gui lines internationally accept d are vailable.  
For population protection it is especially important that the consequences of a particular 
hazardous industrial accident stay within the establishment or affect the population living in its 
surroundings, directly or indirectly, via other intermediary means. 
                                                
6 Gov. Decree 219/2011. (X. 20.) on the protection against major accidents involving dangerous substances. 
http://njt.hu/cgi_bin/njt_doc.cgi?docid=139993.347708, Accessed on 02 January 2018. 
7 Kátai-Urbán, L. “Evaluation and development of the conditions of application of the protection measures against the 
transboundary effects of industrial accidents”. Thesis presented for the degree of PhD. Miklós Zrínyi National Defense 
University, Military Technical Doctoral School, Budapest, 2006. 
Figure 2: Industrial Safety Social Risk. Matrix Risk level (F) Acceptable risk Risk reduction necessary 
Unacceptable risk Number of deaths (N)
Source: Annex 7 of Gov. Decre  19/2011.
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During the course of the official authorization, the above risk analysis procedures – 
which are prepared by the operator during the safety report and the safety analysis – and 
during their review, the authority decides whether the given plant is obliged or not to have 
a threatening effect to draft an off-site protection plan.
Hungary’s national level risk assessments
It is important to mention that besides the hazard source categorization used at settlement 
level, in practice, one can find other groupings as well. In 2011 and 2014, national level 
disaster risk assessments of Hungary were drafted.
The 2011”National Disaster Risk Assessment”8 was elaborated by six working groups. 
Separate working groups dealt with the analysis of (1) flood and inland water hazards, (2) 
effects of extreme weather, (3) social risks, (4) forest fires, (5) earthquakes, (6) industrial 
accidents and risks, identifying them as the “main disaster hazards”. As a result, it was 
established that flood and inland water hazards are regarded as the highest vulnerabilities 
in Hungary under those circumstances. 
The 2014 risk assessment, as opposed to the previous one, identified 12 risk areas broken 
down into 3 groups:
1. Natural risk area
a) Extreme weather,
b) Floods,
c) Geological risks,
d) Epidemics,
e) Space weather.
2. Major accidents risk area
a) Hazardous materials,
b) Road accidents,
c) Nuclear accident.
3. Deliberate incidents
a) Terrorism,
b) Cyber-attack,
c) Security policy crisis,
d) Energy supply crisis.
Compared to the previous national assessment, hazard sources originating in cosmic 
and solar sources have appeared as novelties, and the consideration9 of the risks caused by 
deliberate human activity.  Based on the assessment, in Hungary extreme weather; invasive, 
allergenic or toxic plants; migration (due to climate change); droughts; and severe storms are 
the greatest threat to the population in Hungary. However, according to the above described 
points based on the regulations in force, settlement classification is a decisive factor from 
the aspect of population protection.
8 Gyenes, Zs. “Nemzeti Katasztrófa Kockázat Értékelés”. Veszprém Megyei Katasztrófavédelmi Igazgatóság. 
2011. http://vmkatig.hu/KEK.pdf, Accessed on 24 January 2017.
9 Gov. Decree 1384/2014. (VII. 17.) Report of Hungary’s national catastrophe risk assessment methodology and its 
results. 2014. http://www.katasztrofavedelem.hu/letoltes/szervezet/20140718-katasztrofakockazat-ertekelesrol-
jelentes.pdf, Accessed on 28 December 2017.
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ALL-HAZARD APPROACH OF POPULATION AND PROPERTY 
PROTECTION 
It is necessary to further develop the risk assessment procedure, first of all, to introduce an 
all-hazard assessment of hazard factors affecting the population and property. To this end, 
it is expedient to group the hazard sources by their origin. Considering the above, in my 
opinion, hazard impacts are expedient to be examined in the following three large groups:
1. Natural disasters (hydrological, geological, meteorological, biological, extraterrestrial, 
etc.).
2. Technological disasters (industrial, nuclear, traffic disasters, non-natural fires, etc.).
3. Social disasters (wars, riots, terrorist threats, etc.).
A possible grouping of natural hazard sources of Hungary 
Hazard sources that are obviously irrelevant of human activity or the absence thereof be-
long to this group. They have the peculiarity that we are inherently unable to prevent their 
development, but we can mitigate their effects. Natural hazard sources mainly affect safety 
and security in the field of society and the economy.
In Hungary, natural hazard sources may be:
1. Hydrological
a) Flood, 
b) Inland water,
c) Limnological,
d) Hydrogeological, 
e) Hydro-chemical and hydro-biological.
2. Meteorological
a) Extreme heat,
b) Extreme cold,
c) Effects of winds, 
d) Hydro-meteorological hazards (droughts, forest and vegetation fires, cloudbursts),
e) Thunderstorms, supercells.
3. Geological
a) Earthquake,
b) Slope slide,
c) Soil collapse,
d) Subsidence,
e) River bank, mountain and rock falls,
f) Volcanic eruption.
4. Biological 
a) Human epidemics,
b) Animal and plant health epidemics, 
c) Spread of invasive allergenic or toxic plants,
d) Proliferation of invasive animal species.
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5. Cosmic 
a) Solar radiation,
b) Other cosmic radiations, 
c) Collision with asteroids, minor planets or comets, or with cosmic artificial objects,
d) Supernova explosion,
e) Black holes.
My classification proposal described above lists both cosmic and biological hazards as 
natural hazards, similarly to the 2014 national risk assessment, based on the principle that 
active or negligent human activities are not necessary for their appearance. With regard 
to human epidemics, long discussions could continue on the issue, but in my opinion, the 
natural classification of epidemics is also justified by pathogens that enter human body as 
viruses or bacteria. The emergence of these microorganisms is not exclusively related to 
humans even though, in most cases, they can only survive for longer time in other living 
organisms such as humans.
At geological hazards, I mention volcanic eruptions, the probability of which in Hungary 
is low, since the basaltic volcanoes in the Balaton Uplands usually only have one outbreak 
cycle. At the same time, the temperature of the mantle on the Great Hungarian Plain is 200°C, 
which warms the sediment layer above it, so basaltic magma could break into the surface 
in this area just in a few days. In addition, throughout the entire territory of the Carpath-
ian Basin, the rock mantle is thin (about 70 km). Thus, the malleable material of the upper 
mantle of the Earth can easily flow here, which can lead10 to the melting of the covering 
rocky substance. However, it must be seen that a volcanic eruption can have implications to 
everyday life even from a long distance. For example, during the eruption of the Eyjafjal-
lajökull Volcano in 2010, aviation was interrupted in many countries, thus their impacts 
reached Hungary as well. 
A possible grouping of Hungary’s technological hazards
Hazard sources that appear as a consequence of human activity or as that of the lack of hu-
man activity i.e. negligence have been included in this group. They have a peculiarity that 
their development could be prevented by authoritative rules.
1. Originating in industry
a) Release of toxic, carcinogenic chemical/biological, flammable and explosive substances,
b) Nuclear, radiological accidents,
c) Air pollution,
d) Extensive fires,
e) Accidents originating in planning or implementation.
2. Traffic, transportation hazards
a) By land
b) By air
c) By water
10 Harangi, Sz. Vulkánok: a Kárpát-Pannon térség tűzhányói. Szeged: SZTE TTIK, 2011. 440.
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3. Disruptions of essential systems 
a) Water supply,
b) Electric energy supply,
c) Info-communication systems,
d Defects of supply of fossil energy sources,
e) Communal service providers.
A possible grouping of Hungary’s social hazards 
Social hazard sources are mentioned together by several terms of references as technological 
hazard sources, a civilization-based hazard source. At the same time, if we start out that, in the 
case of natural hazard sources, human activity is irrelevant, while at the grouping of techno-
logical hazard sources described above, it was stated that they derive from active or negligent 
human activity. Thus, the social hazard sources group used in the article is distinct from these, 
since it is based on the typically deliberate human activity. Given the fact that harmful human 
behavior brings these hazard sources to life, their management is also different from the hazard 
sources discussed above. Sometimes, it involves the legitimate use of armed force as well. Due 
to this striking difference, I find it justified that social risks should form a separate large group.
Starting from this approach, we should first look at what social hazard sources can be 
identified in our legal system. Hungary’s Fundamental Law distinguishes11 six types of 
special legal orders in light of threats to the population:
1. State of national crisis in the event of the declaration of a state of war or an imminent 
danger of armed attack by a foreign power (danger of war);
2. State of emergency in the event of armed actions aimed at subverting the lawful order 
or at exclusively acquiring power, or in the event of serious acts of violence endangering 
life and property on a massive scale, committed with arms or with objects suitable to be 
used as arms;
3. State of preventive defense in the event of a danger of external armed attack or in 
order to meet an obligation arising from an alliance (NATO);
4. State of terrorist threat in the event of a significant and direct threat of a terrorist at-
tack or in the event of a terrorist attack;
5. Unexpected attack to repel the attack of external armed groups penetrated into the 
territory of Hungary;
6. State of danger in the event of a natural disaster or industrial accident endangering 
life and property, or in order to mitigate the consequences thereof.
Based on the above listing, a triple grouping can be noticed. The scope of hazard sources 
originating in war or armed conflict (1), from which the danger of a terrorist attack is sepa-
rated (2), however, a jeopardizing factor, supposing an internal social crisis, intended for the 
violent overthrow of the constitutional order (3) appears as well. These three hazards should 
be complemented by migration, based on international political relations and processes 
nowadays witnessed, and cyber security risks. Based on the above, social hazard sources, 
in my opinion, may include the following: 
11 The Fundamental Law of Hungary. Articles 48–54. http://www.njt.hu/cgi_bin/njt_doc.cgi?docid=140968, Ac-
cessed on 20 December 2017.
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1. Internal political crisis
2. Migration, flow of refugees
3. Cyber security
4. Terrorism
5. War, armed conflict
A POSSIBLE EXPANSION OF RISK ASSESSMENT
The assessment of risks of natural and technological hazard sources has already been in-
tegrated into the current procedure, so it is required to incorporate it in the social hazard 
sources listed in the previous subtitle.
The most obvious solution would be if the defense sector developed a special procedure 
similar to the industrial safety procedure. Paragraph (6) of Section 11 of Act CXIII of 2011 
on national defense and the Hungarian Defense Forces and on the measures that may be 
taken in special legal order states that “…the detailed requirements for the preparation, 
execution and stock building tasks related to civil protection obligations during the period 
of an armed conflict are contained in the armed defense plan of the country.” Accordingly, 
critical infrastructures of paramount importance for defense purposes as well as strategically 
or operationally significant traffic junctions, traffic corridors, waterway crossing points, 
or, in the case of fulfillment of other aspects of armed defense required by the defense sec-
tor, such as the distance from the border, they all would be included in the classification of 
settlements on a descriptive basis. Before doing so, however, it is expedient to review the 
current matrix system as well, since I have mentioned it earlier that its three outcomes do 
not show significant alterations among settlements.
Another solution could be if, by reviewing the matrix, an integrated method were de-
veloped. As an example, I use the risk matrix12 elaborated by the US Army, which I have 
complemented with a numbering system.
Probability
Frequent Likely Occasional Seldom Unlikely
A B C D E
Severity Catastrophic I 20 19 17 16 12
Critical II 18 15 14 11 7
Moderate III 13 10 9 6 5
Negligible IV 8 4 3 2 1
Figure 3: Risk assessment matrix
Source: Addition to DD Form 2977
A separate hazard source relevant to all settlements could be analyzed with this matrix. 
Based on the analysis, using the classification described above, the subgroups would get the 
number of the hazard source receiving the highest score, and the numbers of the subgroups 
would be accumulated.
12 “DD Form 2977: Deliberate Risk Assessment Worksheet”. Department of Defense. January 2014. http://www.
benning.army.mil/RangeOps/content/blank_forms/DD2977_DeliberateRiskAssessmentWorksheet_Apr14.
pdf, Accessed on 17 December 2017. 
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For example, within natural hazard sources, in the subgroup of hydrological hazards, 
a settlement would receive 15 points for flood hazards and would receive less for all other 
threatening impacts. In this case, the metric of the hydrological subgroup would be 15. The 
metric of the other four natural hazard source subgroups (meteorological, geological, bio-
logical, cosmic) would be added to this. Thus, in extreme cases, a settlement could receive 
a maximum of 100 points for natural hazard sources, in the case of technological hazard 
sources, 60 points could be received, while in the case of social hazard sources, it could also 
receive 100 points; a minimum of 3 points in the reverse approach.
Of course, the probability of the two extremes is extremely low. The assessment of an 
armed threat could be supplemented by additional compensation procedures; for example, 
a city with a Tisza River crossing could receive a higher value than a settlement of the same 
parameter, but not as decisive in terms of freedom of movement of military force, based 
on a calculated multiplier, until reaching the maximum point. Resources necessary for the 
management of risks could be assigned to the cumulative numbers thus received.
For example, it could be the case that only municipal rescue teams could apply for sup-
port from the government to voluntary civil protection rescue organizations, in the case of 
which a settlement has received 120 or more points. For district and territorial rescue teams, 
the scores could be averaged. Another such source of support could be at the cost of increas-
ing defense-related budget expenditures to the ratio of 2% of the GDP in order to meet the 
requirements of NATO’s resilience. For example, in settlements having received 150 points 
at the assessment, an increase in the investment in resilience and civil preparedness would 
be possible.
Of course, the ratios given here only serve as examples; for the elaboration of the system 
detailed inter-ministerial consultations, impact assessments and expert analyzes are required.
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